Designing Social Security – A Portfolio Choice Approach by Matsen, Egil & Thøgersen, Øystein
WORKING PAPER SERIES  
 
 
 
 
 
No. 11/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
DESIGNING SOCIAL SECURITY – 
A PORTFOLIO CHOICE APPROACH 
 
 
 
 
 
Egil Matsen 
Øystein Thøgersen 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of Economics  
 N-7491 Trondheim, Norway 
www.svt.ntnu.no/iso/wp/wp.htm 
09.10.2001 
 
 
Designing social security –  
 
A portfolio choice approach* 
 
 
Egil Matsen 
Dept. of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, NTNU-Dragvoll,  
N-7491 Trondheim, Norway. Email: egil.matsen@svt.ntnu.no 
 
Øystein Thøgersen 
Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, and 
SNF, Helleveien 30, N-5045 Bergen, Norway. Email: oystein.thogersen@nhh.no 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Public social security systems may provide diversification of risks to individuals’ life-time 
income. Capturing that a pay-as-you-go program (paygo) may be considered as a “quasi-
asset”, we study the optimal size of the social security program as well as the optimal split 
between a funded part and a paygo part by means of a theoretical portfolio choice approach. 
A low-yielding paygo system can benefit individuals if it contributes to hedge other risks to 
their lifetime resources. Moreover, a funded part of the social security system can be justified 
by potential imperfections to the individuals’ free access to the stock market. Numerical 
calculations for Sweden, Norway, the US and the UK demonstrate that the optimal size of 
paygo-part of the pension program varies considerably in response to differences in projected 
growth rates and the correlation between stock returns and growth. Our calculations suggest 
that a paygo program has an important role in the three former countries – but not in the U.K.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Public social security systems may be justified by paternalism, preferences for redistribution 
of income and various types of market failures. This paper considers one of the presumably 
most important types of the latter justification, namely imperfect insurance markets. What we 
have in mind is the nonmarketability of human capital and also potential limitations in many 
individuals’ access to the stock market. We analyze how such imperfections influence the 
optimal design of a social security system. Capturing that a pay-as-you-go (paygo) system 
may be interpreted as a new “quasi-asset” (Persson, 2000), we derive the optimal size of the 
paygo program as well as the optimal split between funded and unfunded systems by means 
of a portfolio choice approach. 
 The main bulk of the recent large literature on social security reforms takes as its 
point of departure that aging populations weaken the financial viability of social security 
systems, which mainly are financed on a paygo basis.1 It is well known that the implicit return 
of the paygo system is given by the natural rate of economic growth, i.e. the joint effect of 
productivity growth and growth in the labor supply. Since this implicit return is lower than 
the real interest rate in a dynamically efficient economy, deterministic models predict that a 
funded program is always superior to a paygo program in steady-state. The policy challenge 
is, consequently, to derive a politically feasible and maybe even pareto-optimal transition 
from a paygo program to a funded program.2  
 The conclusion that the funded program is always superior to a paygo program in 
steady state is not valid, however, when we take into account that returns on both paygo and 
funded systems are stochastic. In a stochastic framework, a lower expected rate of return on 
the paygo system does not necessarily imply that it is an inferior alternative. From the basic 
theory of portfolio choice, we know that whether an asset should be included in an investor’s 
portfolio depends on the covariance with the return on the rest of the portfolio. Thus, a low-
yielding paygo system can benefit individuals if it contributes to hedge other risks to their 
lifetime resources.  
This paper considers three sources of risk to net individual income: i) Technology 
shocks, which determine the wage rate, ii) fluctuations in the size of the population, which 
influence the aggregate labor supply, and iii) a stochastic return on stock market investments. 
Employing a simple theoretical overlapping generations model, we characterize the optimal 
social security system under various assumptions about individuals’ participation in the stock 
                                                 
1 See for example Feldstein (1996), Kotlikoff (1996) and Fehr (2000). 
2 A pareto optimal transition from a paygo program to a funded program is only possible if the reform 
also lowers the excess burdens of the tax-transfer program, see Homburg (1990), Sinn (1999) and 
Miles (2000).  
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market. We also present some numerical evidence. The paper focuses exclusively on risk 
sharing issues in an overlapping generations framework with one representative individual 
within each generation. We disregard intragenerational redistribution and assume that labor 
supply is exogenous.3   
It turns out that the design of optimal pension schemes depends crucially on the 
relevant risk concept. Referring to a two-period life cycle framework, we consider at the 
outset an individual who – in the first period of life – participates in the labor market and 
knows his wage income with certainty. In this case our analysis focuses on the social security 
system’s impact on the sharing of net income risk in the second period of life. We will refer to 
this as traditional risk sharing. In addition to this concept we will also consider the case 
where no components of the representative individual’s net income have been realized yet, 
i.e. the income risk in the first period of life has not yet been revealed. Following Ball and 
Mankiw (2001), this can be given a Rawlsian interpretation in the sense that we imagine that 
all generations are present behind a “veil of ignorance”.  Clearly, ignorance in this setting 
refers to uncertainty about whether a given individual is born into a lucky or unlucky 
generation. We will refer to this concept as Rawlsian risk sharing.4 
This paper adds to the fairly small literature on the design of social security systems 
under uncertainty. The idea that a paygo system can be considered as an asset, has recently 
been explicitly highlighted by Persson (2000) and Dutta et al. (2000). Persson provides a brief 
and verbal discussion of this idea and presents a simple numerical illustration based on 
Swedish data, which indicates that the paygo system may indeed hedge parts of the risk on a 
portfolio of stocks and/or bonds. Persson does not offer any formal analysis, however. Dutta 
et al., on the other hand, do indeed present a formalized analysis based on a portfolio choice 
approach. Their analysis is based on a static mean-variance set-up, which does not capture 
several important aspects of public social security systems. For example, there is no explicit 
modeling of how the paygo system transfers resources between generations. Neither do they 
capture how the individual’s private portfolio decisions are influenced by the public decisions 
on the design of the social security program. We also note that Dutta et al. do not consider 
different risk sharing concepts (i.e. their analysis focuses exclusively on what we have 
defined as traditional risk sharing). Finally, we argue below that mean-variance preferences 
                                                 
3 Many papers on social security reforms seem to assume that the tax-benefit link is very weak in a 
paygo system and fully actuarial (at least marginally) in a funded system. It is quite possible, however, 
to imagine a tax-benefit link which is close to actuarial in a paygo system and rather weak in a system 
which is funded in an aggregate sense, see Miles (2000) and Thøgersen (2001). Thus, even if we 
recognize that the labor supply responses to social security reforms are very important, we will argue 
that it may be benefical to separate the analysis of this issue from the risk sharing aspects of different 
social security systems, which are highlighted in the current paper. 
4 Our definitions of respectively traditional and Rawlsian risk sharing have similarities with the 
distinction between “true-” and “ex-ante risk sharing” made by Hassler and Lindbeck (1997). 
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combined with a proper dynamic overlapping generations setting imply that the derived 
optimal social security program is time-inconsistent. 
The general insight that a mixed paygo and funded system may be optimal due to 
diversification dates back to Merton (1983). Merton studies various tax-transfer programs 
within a theoretical general equilibrium model, and his analysis captures the same stochastic 
variables as in our paper. He does not address the distinction between various risk concepts, 
which turns out to be important in the analysis of the current paper. Neither does Merton 
present any numerical calculations. 
Two recent papers, which are fairly closely related to our analysis, are Miles (2000) 
and Shiller (1999). Using a numerical model, Miles considers the optimal split between 
funded and paygo programs. Contrary to our paper, he focuses on intragenerational 
redistribution of various individual risks and disregards risks to aggregate labor income and 
population growth. Shiller discusses inter- and intragenerational risk sharing as well as 
international risk sharing by means of social security and alternative institutions. He does not 
focus on the split between funded and paygo program, however.  
Obviously, this paper is also related to studies of how a paygo program may 
contribute to intergenerational sharing of income-risk; see for example Gordon and Varian 
(1988), Enders and Lapan (1982, 1993), Thøgersen (1998) and Wagener (2001a, 2001b). 
With an exception of Wagener’s contributions, these papers assume only one source of risk 
and they do not consider a split between funded and paygo programs. We will argue below 
that the main insight from these papers, namely that a paygo program leads to increased 
intergenerational income-risk sharing, hinges on specific stochastic properties of the income 
(or output) path over time. Wagener does capture both stochastic wage growth and stochastic 
interest rates. Analyzing different versions of paygo systems along similar lines as Thøgersen 
(1998), his focus is quite different from this paper, however. 
 The next section presents our theoretical model framework. Section 3 and section 4 
study the optimal design of social security systems in the cases of respectively traditional and 
Rawlsian risk sharing as defined above. We derive the optimal size of the public social 
security program as well as the optimal split between the funded part of the program and the 
paygo part. Intuitively, a low or negative correlation between the stock market returns and the 
natural rate of growth increases the size of the optimal paygo program. Moreover, a funded 
program must be rationalized by imperfections in the individual’s access to the stock market. 
We demonstrate that the case of traditional risk sharing implies a larger paygo program than 
in the case of Rawlsian risk sharing if the coefficient of relative risk aversion exceeds one. 
This reflects that the paygo system contributes to increased wage-income risk as long as the 
trend wage growth is stochastic – and the exposure to wage risk is higher at the outset in the 
Rawlsian case. 
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 Section 5 provides some numerical illustrations for Sweden, Norway, the US and the 
UK. Our calculations suggest a role for paygo-systems in the three former countries – but not 
in the UK. Taking limited stock market participation into account, a mixed paygo/funded 
system is optimal for Sweden, Norway and the US, while a fully funded system is optimal in 
the UK case. Finally, we offer some concluding remarks in section 6. 
 
 
2. A simple overlapping generations model 
 
Set-up 
Our model framework combines a stylized overlapping generations set-up with the lognormal 
approach to portfolio choice problems, which recently has been developed by Campbell and 
Viceira (2001). There are two generations present in any period. The young generation 
participates in a competitive labor market, while the old generation is retired. We define Xt+1 
as the size of the young generation in period t+1 (i.e. generation t+1).  Population growth 
from any period t to period t+1 is stochastic and given by Nt+1, and we have 
ttt XNX )1( 11 ++ += . The representative young individual in any period supplies inelastically 
one unit of labor and receives a gross wage, which is given by Wt+1. The wage growth is 
stochastic due, presumably, to productivity shocks. We define Λt+1 as the wage growth rate, 
i.e. ttt WW )1( 11 ++ Λ+= . It is also useful to define Gt+1 as the growth rate of the aggregate 
wage income, 11111 +++++ Λ+Λ+= ttttt NNG . 
 In the same way as Gordon and Varian (1988) and Ball and Mankiw (2001), we 
assume for simplicity that members of each generation consume only in the second period of 
life. Consequently, the complete net labor income in the first period of life is saved. Savings 
are allocated between two types of financial assets. The first option is a risk-free asset with a 
real rate of return given by Rf. The second option is a risky alternative that yields a stochastic 
real return given by Rt+1. We refer to these assets as bonds and stocks, respectively. 
 The values of three exogenous stochastic variables are revealed in each period: Nt+1, 
Λt+1 and Rt+1. Each of the variables is lognormally, independently and identically distributed 
over time. Because a product of lognormal random variables is lognormal as well, this implies 
that also Gt is lognormal. We define rf ≡ log(1 + Rf), rt+1 ≡ log(1 + Rt+1), nt+1 ≡ log(1 + Nt+1), 
λt+1 ≡ log(1 + Λt+1) and gt+1 ≡ log(1 + Gt+1). It follows that 111 +++ +≡ ttt ng λ . It turns out to be 
useful to write the expected difference between each of the stochastic variables and the risk 
free rate in the following way: [ ] nft rnE µ≡−+1 , [ ] λµλ ≡−+ ft rE 1 , [ ] rft rrE µ≡−+1  and 
[ ] gft rgE µ≡−+1 . We assume that kr µµ >  (k = g, n, λ) and also note that the possibility of  
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0>nµ  does not necessarily ruins dynamic efficiency in a stochastic economy, see Bertocchi 
and Kehagias (1995) and Blanchard and Weil (1991).5 The variance of a given variable i and 
the covariance between two variables i and j are denoted by respectively 2iσ  and ijσ , i,j = r, 
n, λ, g; i ≠ j. Clearly, the assumed distributional properties imply that these expectations, 
variances and covariances are constant over time. 
 We assume that the expected utility of the representative individual in any generation 
t is given by  
 (1) 



−=
−
+
γδ
γ
1
1
1t
tt
C
EU , 
where γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, which is constant across generations, δ is 
the utility discount factor and Ct+1 is the consumption level of the representative individual in 
generation t in period t+1. This utility function yields constant portfolio weights over time for 
the various assets. It turns out that this characteristic simplifies our analysis since it implies 
that the optimal policy variables are constant over time (see below).  
Consumption is given by 
(2) ( ) 111 )1)(1()1()1( +++ Π++−++−= tfptptt RRWC ωωτ , 
where pω  is the fraction of private net income invested in stocks, τ (0 ≤ τ  ≤ 1) is a social 
security contribution rate and Πt+1 is a social security benefit, which is determined by the 
social security formula described below. It is convenient to rewrite (2) as 
(2’) ( ) 111 )(1)1( +++ Π+−++−= tftpftt RRRWC ωτ  
 The sole objective of the government is to run a social security program, which may 
be split between a funded part and a paygo part. The social security contribution in period t is 
given by τWtXt.  A share β (0 ≤ β ≤ 1) of this amount is allocated to the funded program, and 
the remaining share is allocated to the paygo program. In turn, a share gω  of the amount 
allocated to the funded program is invested in stocks, while the remaining amount is allocated 
to riskfree bonds.  Obviously, the government designs the social security system by means of 
three choice variables: τ, β and gω . Throughout the paper we assume that the individuals 
take these variables as given. It is straightforward to show that the social security benefit is 
given by 
(3) ( ) ( )11111 1)1()(1 +++++ +−+−++=Π ttftgftt GWRRRW τβωβτ , 
                                                 
5 As demonstrated by Bertocchi and Kehagias (1995) and Blanchard and Weil (1991), the conditions 
for dynamic efficiency in stochastic overlapping generations models are fairly complex. We assume 
throughout this paper that these conditions are satisfied. See Blanchard and Fisher (1989: 326-329) for 
an accessible discussion of the major issues involved. 
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where the first term on the RHS is the proceeds from the funded part of the program (i.e. 
generation t’s own contributions adjusted for returns) and the second term reflects the paygo 
part (resources transferred from the young generation t+1 to the old generation t). 
 Using (2) and (3), we obtain 
(4) )()(),1( 11111
f
t
f
t
fT
t
T
ttt RGbRRaRRRWC −+−+≡+= +++++ , 
where  
(5a) gpa τβωτω +−≡ )1( , 
(5b) )1( βτ −≡b . 
We interpret TtR 1+  as the effective return on the representative individual’s total portfolio when 
the social security system is taken into account. Moreover, we observe that a and b are the 
effective portfolio shares of gross income, which are invested in stocks and the “paygo-asset”, 
respectively. The share invested in riskfree bonds is of course 1 − a − b. If the social security 
program is a pure paygo program (i.e. the special case of β = 0), τ can be interpreted as the 
representative individual’s forced portfolio share in the paygo-asset. In the following we 
generally assume that all portfolio shares are non-negative (i.e. there are no “short” positions) 
unless otherwise is explicitly stated.  
 
The loglinear approximation 
Even the simple portfolio problem in our model has no exact analytical solution when 
financial markets are not complete. Consequently, we resort to the recently developed 
loglinear approximation method of John Campbell and Luis Viceira (see Campbell and 
Viceira, 2001, and the references therein).   
Because all underlying stochastic variables in our model are lognormal, portfolio 
returns are lognormal. Taking logs in equation (4) yields 
(6) Tttt rwc 11 ++ += , 
where )1log( 11
t
t
T
t Rr ++ +≡ , tt Cc log1 ≡+  and tt Ww log≡ . The next step is to relate the log 
portfolio return to the log returns on the individual assets, see (4). Following Campbell and 
Viceira (2001), a Taylor approximation of (4) yields 
(7) ( ) ( )rggrgrftftfTt abbabargbrrarr σσσσσ 22121)()( 222222111 +++++−+−=− +++ . 
Campbell and Viceira discuss the accuracy of this approximation in more detail. Based on 
work by Barberis (2000) they conclude that the quality of the approximation is good even for 
long-term portfolio problems provided that returns are i.i.d. This is crucial for our analysis 
because the portfolio problems related to the design of social security systems are obviously 
long term. 
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3.  Traditional risk sharing 
 
Focusing on traditional risk sharing (as defined in the introduction) in this section, we must 
adopt the perspective of a representative individual whose wage in the first period of life has 
been realized. Because it turns out that the specified power utility function, see (1), yields 
constant optimal portfolio shares independent on the level of the realized wage, we derive the 
optimal social security system by the maximization of the utility of the representative young 
individual in a given generation t. The optimal system for this generation is also optimal for 
succeeding generations.6  
At this stage it is useful for a moment to imagine an alternative mean-variance 
specification of preferences. Generally, this is not very attractive due to the well-known fact 
that it implies increasing absolute and relative risk aversion. In turn this implies that we 
obtain optimal portfolio weights in risky assets as declining functions of initial income. In the 
current setting this means that the optimal portfolio weights in stocks and the paygo-asset for 
generation t are not optimal for succeeding generations because wage-income fluctuates, i.e. 
the optimal social security system is time-inconsistent. As mentioned in the introduction, this 
problem will occur if we combine the mean-variance portfolio choice set-up of Dutta et al. 
(2000) with the dynamic overlapping generations framework of this paper. Thus, it seems 
necessary to consider a power utility function with constant relative risk aversion in this type 
of social security analyses based on a portfolio approach.  
 As noted by Campbell and Viceira (2001), maximizing of (1) is equivalent to 
maximizing the log of the expression in (1). Omitting the scale factor δ/(1−γ) and using that 
Ct+1 is lognormally distributed, we write the objective function in the following way:7 
(8) 221
1
1 )1(2
1)1(log ctttt cECE σγγγ −+−= +−+ , 
where 11 log ++ ≡ tt Cc  and 2cσ  is the variance of 1+tc . Dividing by (1−γ), using (6) and 
recalling that wt is known and rf constant, we may finally write the expected utility function of 
the representative individual in generation t as, 
(9) ( ) 21 )1(21)( TfTtttt rrEuE σγ−+−= +  
                                                 
6 It follows that our analysis does not capture an optimal transition from a potential initial paygo system 
to a new and re-designed pension system. An explicit modelling of such a transition combined with the 
portfolio set-up in the present paper calls for additional research.  
7 We use the following general result for a lognormal stochastic variable Z: 
11
2
2
1
11 log,log ++++ ≡+= ttztttt ZzzEZE σ , see Campbell and Viceira (2001), p. 20. 
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where 2Tσ  is the variance of Ttr 1+ . 
As a point of departure, we find it useful to consider the benchmark case of no social 
security system at all, i.e. τ = 0. It follows from (5a), (5b) and (7) that  
 (10) 211 )1(2
1)( r
ppf
t
pfT
t rrrr σωωω −+−=− ++ . 
This immediately implies that ( ) 2211 )1( rpprpfTtt rrE σωωµω −+=−+  and 222 )( rpT σωσ = . 
Substituting these expressions into (9), we obtain a straightforward unconstrained 
optimization problem in the decision variable pω . We obtain the solution 
(11) 2
2
2
1
r
r
r
p
γσ
σµ
ω
+
= . 
Intuitively, the optimal individual portfolio weight in stocks is increasing in rµ and 
decreasing in respectively γ and 2rσ . Moreover, we note that the numerator in (11) is equal to 
( ))1/()1(log 1 ftt RRE ++ + .8  
 
Optimal social security when capital markets are perfect 
Let us first assume that both the government and the representative individual have perfect 
access to the financial markets for bonds as well as stocks. There are no information 
asymmetries or transaction costs. Consequently, there is no need for the government to make 
financial investments on the behalf of the representative individual. We also note that the 
representative individual may offset any financial position he is exposed to due to the funded 
part of the social security system provided that “short” positions are allowed. It follows that 
the optimal social security system in this case may be implemented as a pure paygo system, 
i.e. we have β  = 0 at the outset. It then follows from (5a), (5b) and (7) that 
(12) [ ]rgpgrp
g
f
tr
f
t
pfT
t rgrrrr
σττωστστω
στστω
)1(2)1()(
2
1
2
1)(
2
1)()1(
22222
2
1
2
11
−++−−


 +−+

 +−−=− +++
 . 
In turn this implies that 
(13)  
[ ]
[ ]rgpgrp
g
g
r
rpfT
tt rrE
σττωστστω
σµτσµτω
)1(2)1()(
2
1
2
1
2
1)1(
22222
22
1
−++−−


 ++

 +−=−+
 , 
and 
                                                 
8 This follows from the general result given in footnote 7. 
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(14) rg
p
gr
p
T τστωστστωσ )1(2)1()( 222222 −++−= . 
 Substituting (13) and (14) into the utility function (9), we derive the following 
optimal individual portfolio weight in stocks 
(15) 22
2
*
1)1(
2
1
)(
r
rg
r
r
r
p
σ
σ
τ
τ
γστ
σµ
ω −−−
+
= , 
where an asterisk is used in order to denote an optimal value in this “unconstrained case”. In 
order to interpret (15) we assume for a moment that the covariance between the stock market 
returns and the implicit return on the paygo system is zero, 0=rgσ . Then we observe from 
the first term on the RHS of (15) that a larger paygo system (a higher τ) increases the 
individual’s portfolio weight in stocks. In the general case of 0≠rgσ , this effect is 
accompanied by the effect of hedging demand, i.e. the last term on the RHS of (15). Because 
the paygo system introduces a non-tradeable risk caused by stochastic aggregate wage income 
growth, the individual uses the stock market to hedge this risk. Thus, 0<rgσ  contributes to a 
higher *)( pω , while 0>rgσ  contributes to a lower *)( pω . It follows that the paygo system 
increases *)( pω  if 0<rgσ  or if rgσ > 0 and its magnitude sufficiently small. 
 The government may derive the optimal size of the paygo system by the 
maximization of (9) subject to (13), (14) and (15). Solving this problem yields 
(16) [ ])1( 2
1
2
1
22
2
22
*
rgg
r
rg
r
r
g
g
ρσγ
σ
σσµσµ
τ −


 +−

 +
= , 
where rgρ  is the coefficient of correlation between stock market returns and returns on the 
paygo system. The term in the brackets in the denominator of (16) is the unhedgeable, or 
systematic, risk of the paygo system. As long as 1<rgρ , this term is positive. Looking at the 
numerator of (16), we first note that ( ))1/()1(log 1221 fttgg RGE ++=+ +σµ . Thus, the 
optimal size of the paygo system is not surprisingly an increasing function of the expected 
excess return of the paygo system compared to the risk free return. The sign and magnitude of 
the second term on the RHS depends on rgσ . If 0221221 >+>+ ggrr σµσµ , 0<rgσ  will 
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contribute to a larger paygo system.9 Moreover, the existence of a paygo system (i.e. τ > 0) 
can still be justified if 0>rgσ – but that hinges on a not too large magnitude of  2
r
rg
σ
σ . 
 Using (5a), (5b), (15) and (16), we may calculate the representative individual’s 
effective portfolio shares of gross income. In the case of no funded part in the public social 
security system (β = 0) – due to perfect access to the capital market for everybody – the 
effective share in the paygo system is *τ=b , see (5b).  The effective share invested in stocks, 
a, may increase or decrease in response to the paygo system. It follows from (5a) and (15) 
that τσ
σ
τ −−= 1
2
2
r
rg
d
da . Thus, 0<rgσ  implies that the paygo system increases a and leads to a 
lower portfolio share in the riskfree asset (1 − a − b). The case of 0>rgσ  leads to a lower a, 
while the effect on the portfolio share in the riskfree asset is ambiguous. 
 
Imperfect access to the stock market 
The analysis above assumed that individuals have perfect access to the stock market. Is this 
really a realistic assumption? In reality most individuals in the OECD area still have only a 
tiny or zero part of their wealth allocated to the stock market. This is true even in the U.S. 
According to Poterba (2000), a majority of 80 per cent of U.S. households own only 4.1 per 
cent of total household stock market wealth including pension claims in 1998. Consequently, 
it is tempting to assume that most households have limited access to the stock market due to 
various formal as well as informal transaction costs and information problems.10 
If we accept the view that the representative individual does not have perfect access 
to the stock market, it follows that there is indeed a scope for a funded part of the public 
social security program. In our model context we simply assume in this subsection that the 
representative individual does not participate in the stock market due to some type of costs or 
imperfections, i.e. we assume that 0=pω  due to these types of exogenous reasons. In this 
case it follows that the optimal social security system should be designed in order to replicate 
the same effective portfolio weigths as derived in the unconstrained case above. We still 
assume that the government and the representative individual have similar access to risk free 
                                                 
9 The condition 0221
2
2
1 >+>+ ggrr σµσµ  is equivalent to ( ) ( ) 01/()1(log)1/()1(log 11 >++>++ ++ fttftt RGERRE . 
10 In different contexts Abel (2001) assumes that households face fixed cost of participating in the stock 
market, while both Abel and Constantinides et al. (1998) assume that young individuals invest “too 
little” in the stock market due to credit rationing. 
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lending. Consequently, we consider only stock market investments in the funded part of the 
social security system, i.e. 0 < β  ≤ 1 and 1=gω .11 
 We observe from (5a) and (5b) that the case of 1=gω  and 0=pω  implies that the 
effective portfolio weigths are respectively τβ=a  and )1( βτ −=b . Using that these weights 
were )1()( ** τω −= pa  and *τ=b  in the unconstrained case, we easiliy derive the following 
values of τ and gω , which replicate the optimal effective portfolio weights: 
(17a) *** ))(1( pωτττ −+= , 
(17b) 
)1()(
)1()(
***
**
τωτ
τωβ −+
−= p
p
. 
In the case of no individual access to the stock market we may therefore calculate the optimal 
size of the social security system and the optimal split between the paygo part and the funded 
part (in stocks) directly from *τ  and *)( pω , see (15) and (16). Intuitively, we see from (17a) 
that the increase in the social security contribution rate - compared to the unconstrained case - 
is exactly sufficient to restore the effective exposure to the stock market and at the same time 
maintain the size of the paygo system.  
 
 
4. Rawlsian risk sharing 
 
Turning to the Rawlsian risk sharing concept, we imagine that all the representative 
individuals of the different generations are present behind “a veil of ignorance” in the sense 
that they do not know which future generation they will be born into. Thus, at the time of 
enactment of the social security program, the representative individuals of any future 
generation do not know the wage income in the first period of life, nor the wage growth and 
stock market return that determine the net income in the second period of life.  
Clearly, we may in principle consider all sorts of sophisticated risk sharing schemes 
between “all” generations in this Rawlsian case. In, for example, the model of Gordon and 
Varian (1988) it turns out that a risk sharing scheme, which distributes any income shock 
between all future generations, is optimal. Such a scheme is obviously hard to implement, 
however, because it requires a combination of very activistic debt policy and exact knowledge 
of the stochastic income variable’s underlying trend value in each period. Consequently, we 
will restrict ourself to the design of a straightforward social security program along similar 
lines as in the previous section. This – in combination with the constant portfolio weights 
                                                 
11 An alternative but less interesting way to replicate the optimal effective portfolio weights is to set τ = 
1 and then allocate the resources in the same way as in the unconstrained case. 
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property of the power utility function – implies that we may derive the optimal Rawlsian 
program by the maximization of the period t –1 expected utility of the representative 
individual in a given generation t. 
  In the case of Rawlsian risk sharing we rewrite equation (4) as 
(4’) )()(),1)(1( 111111
f
t
f
t
fT
t
T
tttt RGbRRaRRRWC −+−+≡+Λ+= ++++−+ , 
(where 1−tW  is known with certainty). In turn the loglinearized version of this equation, 
equation (6), can be rewritten 
(6’) Ttttt rwc 111 +−+ ++= λ , 
where Ttr 1+  is still given by the Taylor approximation in equation (7). We assume for 
simplicity that population growth is deterministic and given by NNt =+1  for all t. This 
implies that 11 ++ += tt ng λ  where )1log( Nn +≡ . It follows that 22 λσσ =g  and λσσ rrg =  in 
(7). We still assume as a benchmark case that the individuals have perfect access to the stock 
market, i.e. the optimal social security program can be implemented as a pure paygo program 
(β = 0). Consequently, )1( τω −= Pa  and τ=b  in (7). 
 Using that 1−tw  is known at the time of maximization and 
fr  is constant, we may 
write the utility function (8) as 
(18) { } 2111 )1(21)()( cfTttttt rrEuE σγλ −+−+= +−− , 
where 2cσ  is the variance of 1+tc . It follows from (7) that 
(19) [ ]λλ
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 . 
Using the definition [ ] λµλ ≡− ft rE  and noting that ng += λµµ , this implies that 
(20)  
[ ]
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 , 
and 
(21) λλλ σττωστστωσσ rprpc )1)(1(2)1()( 2222222 +−++−+= . 
We assume that the representative individuals still make their optimal portfolio 
decisions after the magnitude of their wage income has been realized. This implies that the 
optimal individual portfolio weight in stocks is still given by (15) when we recall that 
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λσσ rrg =  in the current case. The government may therefore derive the optimal τ by the 
maximization of (18) subject to (15), (20) and (21). This yields 
(22) [ ])1(
)(
)1(
2
1
2
1
22
2
2
2
22
*
λλ
λλ
λ
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σσµσµ
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r
r
r
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−+

 +−

 +
= . 
Comparing (22) to (16), when 22 λσσ =g , λσσ rrg =  and λρρ rrg =  in the latter case, we 
immediately observe that the difference between the optimal size of the paygo system in the 
case of Rawlsian risk sharing versus the case of traditional risk sharing is given only by the 
last term in the numerator in (22). In order to interpret this difference we first note that the 
case of Rawlsian risk sharing captures an additional source of risk facing a given generation 
t+1, namely tλ . We also note from the utility function (18) that a partial increase in 2cσ  
actually increases utility. This may seem strange at first sight. We recall, however, that 2cσ  is 
the variance of log consumption and, using the mathematical result given in footnote 6, this 
implies that the utility function (18) can be rewritten as 
(23) { } 121111 21)1)(1(log)( −−+−− −−−+Λ+= tfctTttttt wrWREuE γσ . 
According to (23) the representative individual trades off the log of the expected arithmetic 
consumption level versus the variance of the log of consumption. It follows from (18) and 
(23) that an increase in 2cσ  leads to a higher value of { }111 )1)(1(log −+− +Λ+ tTttt WRE  for a 
given value of )( 111
T
tttt rwE +−− ++ λ  in the case of 1<γ . 
We are now able to give the intuition for the difference between Rawlsian and 
traditional risk sharing. Rawlsian risk sharing considers an additional source of risk, which 
implies that the ex-ante risk related to a given amount invested in the paygo-asset increases 
(compared to traditional risk sharing). In the case of 1>γ , this leads to a smaller paygo 
program in the Rawlsian case. In the following empirical part of this paper we will indeeed 
argue that this is the most likely case. The interpretation is simply that the government on 
behalf of the representative individual offsets parts of this increased exposure to wage risk by 
means of a smaller investment in the paygo-asset. The opposite respons follows from 1<γ . 
In this case a higher exposure to wage risk contributes to an increase in 
{ }111 )1)(1(log −+− +Λ+ tTttt WRE , which dominates the effects of a higher 2cσ , see (23). Clearly, 
1=γ  yields a boundary case characterized by similar portfolio weigths as in the case of 
traditional risk sharing for the the paygo-asset as well as for the other assets. 
Looking at other papers on the risk sharing implications of paygo program, a 
common conclusion is that a paygo program contributes to increased intergenerational 
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income-risk sharing in the cases where the risk sharing concept is analogous to what we have 
called Rawlsian risk sharing, see Gordon and Varian (1988), Enders and Lapan (1982, 1993) 
and Thøgersen (1998). In our analysis the paygo program contributes to a higher exposure to 
wage income risk, however. The discrepancy is due to different assumptions regarding the 
stochastic properties of income (or output) growth our time. The cited series of papers all 
assume that the trend growth of income (output) is deterministic and even zero. In that case a 
paygo program leads to increased intergenerational risk sharing because each independent 
income shock is shared between the young and the old generation.12 In the present paper we 
assume that the (trend) income growth rate is stochastic, however. Then it is impossible for 
the representative individual in a given generation t to avoid the full exposure to the income 
shock in period t by means of a paygo program. The reason is that this individual will receive 
a paygo pension benefit equal to )1)(1()1( 11 NW ttt +Λ+Λ+ +−τ . On the other hand, if trend 
growth was deterministic (and the shocks still independently and identically distributed), the 
pension benefit would only be subject to the income shock in period t+1 and not to the 
income shock in period t. 
 Throughout our analysis of Rawlsian risk sharing we have assumed that the 
representative individuals in all generations have perfect access to the stock market. If the 
representative indivividuals do not participate in the stock market, the government may, 
however, maintain the optimal exposure to the stock market and the paygo-asset by adjusting 
τ and introducing a funded part of the social security system. This can be done in exactly the 
same way as derived in the last part of section 3, i.e. the equations (17a) and (17b) are still 
valid – but the relevant *τ  is of course given by (22) in the case of Rawlsian risk sharing. 
 
 
5. Numerical illustrations  
 
This section attempts to provide numerical estimates of the optimal size of the paygo system 
and the portfolio weights derived above for four countries: The US, the UK, Sweden and 
Norway. The variances and covariances used in the calculations are estimated from historical 
data series. These series are described in more detail in the data-appendix. Stock market 
returns are calculated from total value indices for each individual country. The implicit return 
                                                 
12 In order to see this imagine a representative individual in a given generation t, who works and 
receive a stochastic income wt in the first period of life and is retired and receives only a pension 
benefit in the final second period of life. Let wt=w+et where w is the constant trend income and et is an 
i.i.d. stochastic shock. Let Var(et )=σ2 , let the real interest rate be zero and disregard population 
growth. Then it is straightforward to show that the variance of the net life income of this individual is 
equal to τ2σ2 + (1–τ2)σ2, where τ  is the contribution rate of a paygo system. Clearly, the existence of a 
paygo system (0<τ<1) reduces this variance below unity due to intergenerational risk sharing. 
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of the paygo system, gt , is calculated exactly (based on data for labor force growth and real 
wage growth) in the Norwegian case and approximated by using data for real GDP growth in 
the other countries. We also estimate the mean expected stock market returns from the 
historical data. Recogizing that future growth rates for gt are expected to decline in all the 
countries in our sample due mainly to a stagnation in the labor supply, we use growth 
projections from recent government white papers in order to specify E(gt). As an estimate of 
the riskfree real interest rate, we use fr  = 2 per cent for all countries.  This is in line with the 
real returns on short-term money market instruments reported by Campbell (2001, table 1) for 
several countries.13 Finally, we assume that the coefficient of relative risk aversion is given by 
γ  = 5 for all countries. 
 Table 1 reports the key statistics from our historical data, the projected mean growth 
rates and our assumptions for fr  and γ. We observe from Table 1 that equity returns have 
been high on average and volatile in all countries for our sample periods.  It is also interesting 
to note that the contemporaneous annual correlation between equity returns and economic 
growth (gt) is low for all countries, and even negative for Norway. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 
Traditional risk sharing 
Adopting the traditional risk sharing concept, we first consider the benchmark case of no 
public pension system. Panel A in Table 2 gives the optimal individual allocation to stocks in 
this case (calculated from equation (11)).  Riskfree savings range from about 60 per cent of 
the representative individual’s portfolio in Sweden to about 85 per cent in Norway (which had 
a rather poor stock market performance in our sample period). 
 
 [Table 2 about here] 
 
 Panel B reports the values of the key variables when capital markets are perfect and 
the optimal pension system is a pure paygo system. Given the data and assumptions in Table 
1, the attractiveness of a paygo program varies widely across the four countries. In order to 
explain the differences in the optimal contribution rates (i.e. the effective portfolio share in 
the paygo asset), we first look at Norway and the UK.  In both these countries the expected 
excess return on the paygo asset is negative (µg + ½σg2 < 0).  Hence, a necessary condition for 
                                                 
13 As noted by Campbell (2001), the returns on short-term t-bills are not completely risk-free, but we 
ignore this complication here. 
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the optimal contribution rate to be strictly positive is that σrg < 0, see equation (16).  This is 
not fulfilled for the UK (table 1), and consequently we obtain τ* = 0 in this case.14  
In Norway the projected value of gµ  (= frgE −)( ) is even lower than for the UK, 
but still the negative correlation between stock market returns and growth implies that the 
contribution rate should be positive (albeit low in this example). Thus, it is the hedging 
properties of the paygo asset that is attractive in the Norwegian case. For Sweden and the US, 
on the other hand, the combination of comparatively high growth rates (higher than fr ) and 
low values of the correlation ρrg imply positive contribution rates. In the US case, the 
projected growth rate is so much higher than fr  that the portfolio weight in the paygo-asset 
should be larger than 50 per cent. 
Comparing the second row in panel B to panel A, we see that private individual risk-
taking increases for the countries with positive contribution rates.  For Sweden and the US, 
this occurs despite a negative hedging demand (ρrg > 0).  However, the total effective 
portfolio weight in stocks (given by a = ω(1−τ) in this case, see eq. (5a)) decreases due to this 
positive correlation. For Norway we have ρrg < 0. This induces positive hedging demand, 
which increases total effective risk taking in the stock market. In all countries except the UK, 
the total portfolio weight in risky assets (a + b) is much higher than in the benchmark case of 
no public pension program. 
 In panel C of Table 2 we report the key variables in the case of no individual 
participation in the stock market ( 0=pω ). In Norway, the rather modest stock market 
performance implies that the optimal contribution rate should be increased with 
approximately 15 percentage points. In the other countries, the contribution rate increases 
with approximately 35 percentage points compared to the case with perfect capital markets. 
Moreover, the optimal UK system will now be fully funded (with all contributions invested in 
stocks) and characterized by a contribution rate equal to the portfolio weight in stocks in the 
case of perfect capital markets. In the other three countries the pension system is partially 
funded. It follows that the effective allocation of gross income to the different assets 
replicates that in panel B. 
 A possible objection to our analysis is that the various variances and correlations in 
Table 1 are calculated from annual data, while pension saving typically has much longer 
investment horizons. In particular, one may be concerned that the correlation between stock 
returns and aggregate wage growth may be substantially higher for longer horizons, and that 
the risk sharing properties embedded in a paygo system thus weakens (Jermann, 1999). Figure 
                                                 
14 The optimal τ is actually negative for the UK, but we rule out negative contribution rates per 
definition. 
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1 plots the correlation coefficient between GDP growth and stock returns (based on 
overlapping growth rates) for Sweden, the UK and the US, varying the horizon between 1 and 
30 years (Norway is excluded due to the short data series for Norwegian stock returns). 
 
 [Figure 1 about here] 
 
No general pattern emerges from this Figure. While the US correlation between growth and 
stock returns clearly increases for horizons longer than 20 years (as Jermann, 1999, 
demonstrates), the UK data show a low and decreasing correlation for long horizons, and the 
Swedish correlation is remarkably stable. Moreover, the correlation reaches its maximum for 
short horizons (2-3 years) for both Sweden and the UK. Consequently, our data do not in 
general support the claim that a long investment horizon diminishes the importance of paygo 
systems in retirement savings. 
 
Rawlsian risk sharing 
Turning to the Ralwsian risk sharing concept, we recall that we derived the optimal 
contribution rate, given in (22), under the assumption of deterministic population growth. To 
provide a meaningful comparison between the contribution-rates under traditional and 
Rawlsian risk sharing we now assume that all fluctuations in gt is due to fluctuations in 
productivity (and real wage) growth. This is, of course, a very crude approximation, which 
nevertheless allows us to get a quantitative impression of the significance of the Rawlsian risk 
sharing concept. Referring to equation (22), we assume that σλ = σg and ρrλ = ρrg. 
 
 [Table 3 about here] 
 
 Panel B of Table 3 reports the key variables under Ralwsian risk sharing. As we 
know from section 4, the optimal contribution rates are lower under this risk sharing concept 
because we have γ > 1, see (22). The optimal contribution rate is therefore still zero for the 
UK. For Sweden and the US, the difference in contribution rates under the two risk sharing 
concepts turns out to be very small. The reason can easily be seen from the last term in the 
nominator of equation (22). We observe that the difference in contribution rates between the 
two risk sharing regimes is lower the closer ρrλ is to 0. As we saw in Table 1 (recalling that 
ρrλ = ρrg), the absolute value of this correlation coefficient is indeed low in the annual data for 
Sweden and the US. This implies that the term 2rλσ  in (22) is very small. Even if we imagine 
for a moment that γ = 30, the difference between the contribution rates under the two regimes 
is just 1.23 percentage-points in the US case. For Norway, the absolute value of ρgr is 
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approximately 0.3, and this is sufficient to create a substantial difference between the 
contribution rates under the two risk sharing concepts. In fact, the optimal contribution rate 
falls to 0 when the concept is changed from traditional to Rawlsian in the Norwegian case. 
 Finally, panel B of Table 3 demonstrates that the effect of non-participation in stocks 
markets is analogous to what we saw under traditional risk sharing (compare to the difference 
between the panels B and C of Table 2). 
 
 
6.  Final remarks 
 
During the recent years a large part of the literature on social security systems has dealt with 
comparisons between funded and paygo program as well as the design of potential transitions 
from paygo financing to funded systems. Adopting a portfolio choice approach, this paper has 
provided a different perspective on the design of social security systems. Interpreting the 
paygo system as a “quasi-asset” along the lines of Persson (2000), the analysis has focused on 
the optimal size of the paygo system and the optimal split between the paygo part of pension 
savings and the funded part. Clearly, the funded part of the pension savings can – from a 
representative individual’s point of view – be handled individually if access to the stock 
market is perfect, or by the government if this access is imperfect.  
 The general insight from our analysis is that a low-yielding paygo system can benefit 
the representative individuals if the correlation between the implicit return on the paygo 
program and the stock market returns is low or negative. We have derived analytical formulas 
for the optimal size of the paygo system and the optimal magnitude of the funded pension 
saving in the stock market. The optimal size of the paygo program depends on the risk 
concept. It turns out that the optimal paygo system is smaller under “Rawlsian risk sharing” 
(which captures all risks to the net lifetime income of the representative individual at birth) 
than under “traditional risk sharing” (which capture only risks which are realized in the 
representative individual’s second period of life). The reason is that the paygo system 
increases the exposure to wage income risk.  
 We provide numerical illustrations for the USA, the UK, Sweden and Norway. It 
turns out that the paygo-asset should play a role in pension savings in all of these countries 
except in the UK. Not surprisingly, the size of the paygo system is rather sensitive to the 
estimated mean implicit return on the paygo system. The Norwegian case illustrates, however, 
that a negative correlation between equity returns and growth may justify a paygo program 
even if the mean expected return on the paygo asset is very low. With limited stock market 
participation, our calculations suggest that a mixed paygo/ funded system is optimal (except 
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in the UK case). Finally, we note that the Rawlsian risk sharing concept reduces the scope for 
paygo programs marginally in the US and Sweden, and more significantly in Norway.  
 Looking at the social security reform agenda in many OECD countries, we note that 
attempts are made to introduce funded parts in systems, which have been entirely paygo 
financed at the outset. Assuming that the representative individual does not have perfect 
access to the stock market, our analysis clearly suggests that such developments would 
improve the risk sharing properties of the social security program.  
 
 
Data appendix 
 
Stock market data 
Norway: The Morgan Stanley Capital International Gross Return Index in local currency.  
Year-end quotes from 1969 to 1999. Available at www.msci.com. 
Sweden, UK and US: The annual data from Campbell (1999) updated through 1998. They are 
described in detail in the appendix to Campbell (1999).  
 
GDP / calculation of gt  
Norway: Data on labor force growth are collected from OECD Labor Force Statistics, while 
data on wage growth are collected from the Hourly Earnings Index in IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics, 2000. 
Sweden, UK and US: Real GDP data are collected Maddison (1991) for the period up to and 
including 1989 and then from IFS, 2000 for 1990-1998. 
 
Growth projections 
Norway: The latest Government Long Term Program (Government White Paper 
“Stortingsmelding 30, 2001/2002”) assumes mean annual GDP growth rates equal to 1.7 per 
cent over the 1999-2010 period. Thus, E[g] = ln(1.017) = 1.69 per cent. 
Sweden: The latest Government Long Term Program (“Government White Paper SOU 
2000:7”) assumes mean annual GDP growth rates equal to 2.5 per cent over the 1999-2010 
period and 1.8 per cent for the period 2005-2008. We use the average of these numbers (2.22 
per cent), which implies E[g] = ln(1.0222) = 2.20 per cent. 
UK: Long run projections in the “Economic and Financial Strategy Report” of the 
Government Budget for 2001 assume annual growth rates amounting to 2.25 per cent for 
2000-2010 and 1.75 per cent for 2011-2030.  We use E[g] = ln(1.019) = 1.88 per cent. 
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USA: The “2001 – Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers” assumes annual 
growth rates equal to 3.1 per cent over the 2000-2008 period and 2.9 per cent from 2009 and 
onwards. We use an average of these projections; E[g] = ln(1.03) = 2.96 per cent. 
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Table 1: Baseline values of key variables and parameters 
 
 Norway Sweden UK USA 
Panel A: Values from historical data 
Period 1970-99 1920-98 1919-98 1891-1998 
r  5.07 % 7.07 % 7.41 % 6.93 % 
g
r
gr
σ
σ
ρ
 
3.57 % 
34.85 % 
−0.298 
6.28 % 
18.65 % 
0.055 
3.50 % 
21.69 % 
0.087 
5.77 % 
18.67 % 
0.112 
Panel B: Projected and assumed values 
E[g] 1.69 % 2.20 % 1.88 % 2.96 % 
rf 2.00 % 2.00 % 2.00 % 2.00 % 
γ 5 5 5 5 
 Note: r  denotes the historical mean stock market return. 
 
 
Table 2: Private and public allocation rules under traditional risk sharing 
 
 Norway Sweden UK USA 
Panel A: Optimal allocation to stocks, no pension system (τ = 0) 
a = ω p 15.06 % 39.16 % 32.99 % 38.28 % 
Panel B: Allocation with pure paygo (β = 0), perfect capital markets 
τ 4.94 % 13.56 % 0 54.32 % 
ω  p 16.00 % 45.01 % 32.99 % 79.68 % 
A 15.21 % 38.91 % 32.99 % 36.40 % 
b = τ  4.94 % 13.56 % 0 54.32 % 
Panel C: Allocation with non-participation in stock-markets (ω p= 0) 
τ 20.16 % 52.46 % 32.99 % 90.71 % 
β 75.48 % 74.15 % 100 % 40.12 % 
a 15.21 % 38.91 % 32.99 % 36.40 % 
b 4.94 % 13.56 % 0 54.32 % 
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Table 3: Ralwsian vs. traditional risk sharing 
 
 Norway Sweden UK USA 
Panel A: Ralwsian risk sharing, perfect capital markets 
τ 0 13.32 % 0 53.30 % 
ω p 15.06 % 48.56 % 32.99 % 78.02 % 
a 15.06 % 42.10 % 32.99 % 36.43 % 
τ(trad) − τ(R) 4.94 % 0.24 % 0 1.01 % 
Panel B: Ralwsian risk sharing, non-participation in stocks markets 
τ 15.06 % 55.41 % 32.99 % 89.74 % 
β 100 % 75.97 % 100 % 40.60 % 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Correlation between GDP growth and stock returns over different horizons. 
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